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•	 The international monetary system comprises the 
policies and official arrangements related to the 
international balance of payments, in particular, 
exchange rate arrangements .
•	 The current system is in need of reform . It has not 
facilitated the timely and symmetric adjustment in 
the real exchange rate necessary to accommodate 
the integration of China and other emerging- 
market economies into the global economy . 
This lack of adjustment contributed to the global 
financial crisis and recession, and is hindering 
the global recovery because it is forestalling the 
required rotation of global demand .
•	 The G-20 countries should co-operate to promote 
the system’s transition to one in which all system-
ically important countries and currency areas have 
market-determined flexible exchange rates sup-
ported by coherent macroeconomic and financial 
sector policy frameworks to ensure that global 
growth is strong, sustainable and balanced .
T
he current international monetary system (IMS) 
has been described as a “non-system” or 
“hybrid,” owing to the lack of a coherent set of 
exchange rate policies among systemically important 
economies. In practice, the system has not been 
able to adjust efficiently to large shocks, such as the 
integration of China into the global economy, thus 
allowing the occurrence of large and unsustainable 
current account imbalances. Indeed, many observers 
attribute the 2007–09 financial crisis and the current 
weak recovery of the global economy, in part, to the 
system’s inherent instability—in particular, to the lack 
of timely and symmetric adjustment of real exchange 
rates to these imbalances.
1 The authorities in many 
emerging-market economies (EMEs), in particular, 
have acted to constrain capital flows and exchange 
rate movements, thereby preventing a necessary 
rotation of global demand. 
These failings have not gone unnoticed—the Group 
of 20 (G-20) has identified the need to reform the 
IMS (G-20 2010). Many proposals have been put 
forward to address the current system’s ubiquitous 
flow and stock imbalances, including an expanded 
role for Special Drawing Rights (Williamson 2009) 
and the promotion of alternative reserve currencies 
to the U.S. dollar (Zhou 2009). But such proposals 
are simply coping mechanisms, designed to main-
tain the status quo, rather than effective solutions 
for the system’s inherent problems (Carney 2009). 
Broader proposals, such as moving to a single world 
reserve currency—with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) as lender of last resort—are patently 
impractical. Missing from the current debate is a 
well-articulated vision for an efficient and resilient 
IMS—one consistent with both the individual and 
collective best interests of all countries. Also absent 
1  See Fischer (2009), Carney (2009), Rajan (2010), Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2009) and Banque de France (2011).
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vision from the current predicament. 
This article begins with an assessment of the 
existing IMS, noting its strengths, but also high-
lighting its ongoing weaknesses. We then propose 
an avenue for the reform of the IMS, in which all 
systemically important countries and currency areas 
adopt market-based and convertible floating 
exchange rates supported by appropriate monetary, 
fiscal and financial sector policies.
2, 
3 We also 
explore the roles of the G-20 countries and major 
international financial institutions in facilitating this 
transition. 
An IMS in which flexible exchange rates predominate 
would be much more resilient and stable since it 
would allow more timely and symmetric, and thus 
more efficient, adjustment to shocks, thereby pre-
cluding persistent external imbalances and large 
accumulations of reserves.
4 These changes would 
facilitate the transformation of the IMS into a more 
market-based and decentralized system that would 
better accommodate the emerging multi-polar global 
economy. 
Characterizing the International 
Monetary System
The IMS comprises the policies and official arrange-
ments related to the international balance of pay-
ments (Carney 2009; Lipsky 2010). Specifically, the 
IMS consists of arrangements for (i) exchange rates, 
(ii) current payments and capital flows, and (iii) inter-
national reserves. It is also (iv) a collection of institu-
tions, rules, standards and conventions that govern 
its operation.
Exchange rates
The current IMS has been characterized as a hybrid 
or non-system, because the systemically important 
2  Fiscal policy must be sustainable and therefore coherent with monetary 
and exchange rate policies. Indeed, the overall coherence of medium-
term frameworks for exchange rate and monetary, fiscal and financial 
sector policies is critical for maintaining internal and external stability.
3  In this vision, small economies, for which the advantages of an in-
dependent monetary policy are outweighed by transactions costs in 
both trade and finance, would have a permanent fixed exchange rate, 
either a hard peg or a common currency.
4  Historically, there are several examples of large and persistent current 
account imbalances being driven by market forces and having a positive 
welfare impact; for example, large flows of foreign direct investment into 
Australia’s resource sector and into Canada’s infrastructure at the end 
of the nineteenth century. It is important to note, however, that these 
imbalances were accompanied by significant appreciations in the real 
exchange rate.
countries do not share the same exchange rate 
regime or nominal anchor. Roughly two-thirds of 
the 40 largest countries in the world (measured by 
market-based GDP) have floating exchange rates, 
and one-third have exchange rates that are managed 
or fixed, representing roughly three-quarters and 
one-quarter of global GDP, respectively. Until 
recently, the number of countries with floating 
exchange rates had been increasing, but this trend 
has stopped, if not reversed.
Current payments and capital flows
Most advanced countries have convertible curren-
cies and open capital accounts. Practices among 
EMEs differ, but until the 2007–09 crisis, the trend 
had been to remove controls and liberalize these 
payments and capital flows. 
Since 2000, these arrangements have contributed to 
the buildup of persistent and large current account 
surpluses and deficits, as a percentage of both 
global and national GDP (Chart 1). For example, the 
U.S. current account deficit peaked at almost 6 per 
cent of GDP in 2006, and Chinese surpluses at  
10.1 per cent of GDP in 2007. While the financial 
crisis led to a reduction in these imbalances, this 
was largely the result of the cyclical downturn in 
advanced economies, which depressed their demand 
for imported goods and services. Current account 
imbalances are therefore expected to persist over 
the coming years as these economies recover. Even 
more striking is the rapid increase in capital flows 
Chart 1:  Global imbalances
Current account as a percentage of global GDP
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From 1970 to 2007, gross foreign assets and liabil-
ities increased from 40 per cent of GDP to nearly 
300 per cent of GDP for G-20 countries (Chart 2). 
Moreover, changes in gross foreign assets and  
liabilities have swamped movements in the current 
account. This dramatic rise in gross flows, which 
reflects the increase in financial globalization, is one 
of main structural changes in the IMS in recent 
years. These closer financial links among countries 
facilitated the transmission and magnified the impact 
of the financial crisis. 
International reserves 
Many advanced economies with a flexible exchange 
rate have reduced their holdings of reserves as a 
percentage of GDP over the post–Bretton Woods 
era. In contrast, a notable feature of the IMS over the 
past decade has been the rapid accumulation of 
reserves in emerging economies, concurrent with the 
increase in current account imbalances. From 2000 
onward, these reserves have risen from less than 
US$1 trillion to almost US$7 trillion (Chart 3), much 
of which is invested in U.S. government debt. By 
most metrics, this buildup far exceeds that needed 
for precautionary purposes. For example, reserves 
have increased significantly as a percentage of GDP 
for the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) (Chart 4). Substantial and persistent current 
account imbalances and the resulting extraordinary 
accumulation of reserves speak directly to the lack 
of timely and symmetric adjustment of real exchange 
rates in the IMS.
Institutions 
The IMS is overseen by a complex and evolving set 
of institutions that seek to establish and promote 
compliance with a wide variety of rules, standards 
and conventions in terms of both macroeconomic 
and financial sector policies (Figure 1).
5 The over-
arching goal of this global financial architecture is 
to preserve global financial and monetary stability. 
The key institutions that monitor and oversee the 
system—the IMF, the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
and the G-20—identified many of the risks that sub-
sequently materialized during the 2007–09 crisis. 
But they failed to appreciate the true magnitude of 
5  The choice of an exchange rate regime is a sovereign decision of the 
individual country. The IMF and other institutions can only exercise 
surveillance over a country’s policies and make non-binding policy 
recommendations.
Chart 2:  Total G-20 gross foreign assets and liabilities
Note: Excludes Saudi Arabia from calculation of the G-20 total
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007) and authors’ calculations
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Chart 3:  Reserves in emerging and developing 
economies
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics  Last observation: June 2011
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IMS has experienced since the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system, it has generally functioned 
well in supporting increased trade and capital flows. 
Weaknesses 
In theory, the fact that countries have different nom-
inal anchors for their monetary policy frameworks 
(price stability versus exchange rate stability) is not 
necessarily a problem for the stability of the IMS, as 
long as market-based adjustment of real exchange 
rates can take place in response to shocks, either via 
movements in the nominal exchange rate or through 
changes in domestic wages and prices. Without a 
commitment to allow real exchange rate adjustment, 
the current IMS is plagued by two fundamental and 
pervasive asymmetries. 
Under fixed exchange rates, surplus 
countries can thwart the conventional 
adjustment mechanism with sterilization
First, there is no effective channel through which 
market pressures can, in a timely manner, force 
countries with managed or fixed exchange rates 
and with balance of payments surpluses to permit 
equilibrating adjustment in their real exchange rates. 
In particular, under fixed exchange rates, surplus 
countries can thwart the conventional adjustment 
mechanism by sterilizing the impact of the balance of 
payments surplus on the money supply. Sterilization 
involves central bank sales of government bonds or 
central bank bond issuance to the private sector (or 
to a state-owned or -controlled banking sector). 
This is typically done in the presence of capital con-
trols, which essentially prevent the private sector 
from undoing the central bank’s sterilized foreign 
exchange intervention.
7
Second, a unilateral depreciation of the real 
exchange rate is very difficult to achieve under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, because domestic 
prices and wages are generally less flexible down-
ward than upward. Depreciation consequently 
requires large and painful gaps in output and 
employment, as have been experienced in Greece 
and Spain in the aftermath of the crisis.
7  In a similar vein, the reserve ratio for banks can be increased to absorb 
the excess liquidity resulting from exchange rate interventions. For 
instance, China has increased its reserve ratio from 17 per cent to 
21.5 per cent over the past year.
the risks and their consequences if realized, or 
to gain the political traction necessary to reform 
members’ policies and allow adjustment to external 
imbalances. They were thus ineffective in preventing 
the buildup of the macroeconomic and financial 
vulnerabilities that contributed to the crisis.
6 
Assessing the System: Some 
Strengths, but Many Weaknesses
Strengths
The current IMS has facilitated an enormous expan-
sion of global growth, trade and financial integration: 
since the 1970s, annual growth in global GDP has 
averaged more than 3 per cent, global trade has 
increased by nearly double the rate of GDP, and 
gross foreign assets and liabilities by more than 
three times. Most importantly, this expansion has 
included the integration of China and India—nearly 
one-third of the world’s population—into the global 
economy. Between 1980 and 2010, China’s economy 
rose from the world’s twelfth largest to the second 
largest, as its size increased more than twelvefold. 
Globalization, particularly in the form of trade and 
foreign direct investment, has allowed China not only 
to benefit from access to markets, technology 
transfer and increased specialization, but also to 
realize its comparative advantage in producing 
labour-intensive manufactured goods. Despite the 
6  The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (2011) notes many of the short-
comings in Fund surveillance during the lead-up to the crisis.
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leading many Chinese, especially the owners of small 
and medium-sized enterprises, to boost their savings 
to self-finance their investments (Chart 7). 
These structural imbalances contributed to the finan-
cial crisis by channelling excess global savings into 
the U.S. capital market and exposing regulatory and 
supervisory gaps in the U.S. financial system. These 
flows set off a search for yield and created undue 
pressure to generate highly rated assets (Bernanke 
2011), partly by creating incentives to exploit cracks 
in the regulatory framework and undertake destabil-
izing regulatory arbitrage across domestic and 
international regulatory jurisdictions (Rajan 2010; 
Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009). 
These two effects contribute to one of the major 
weaknesses of the IMS—the lack of symmetric 
adjustment. Simply, surplus countries can thwart 
adjustment far longer than deficit countries, and thus 
adjustment is often borne disproportionately by the 
latter, with harsh consequences. When it occurs on a 
global scale, the lack of symmetric adjustment can 
lead to deficient global demand.
The increasing proportion of the global GDP in the 
hands of countries that have managed or fixed 
exchange rate regimes and capital controls, and that 
are accumulating and sterilizing reserves, represents 
an unprecedented threat to the stability of the IMS 
and the global economy. In fact, countries whose 
currencies comprise more than 50 per cent of the 
U.S. real effective exchange rate (REER) are actively 
thwarting adjustment. To gauge the effect of these 
interventionist policies, it is useful to compare their 
impact on real exchange rates by comparing the 
movements in the REER of East Asian EMEs that 
have largely maintained this set of policies with those 
of Latin American EMEs that have largely embraced 
flexible exchange rates, open capital accounts and 
inflation targeting. While the Latin American EMEs 
have experienced a significant appreciation in their 
real exchange rates, as the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis would predict, the real exchange rates of 
the Asian EMEs have remained relatively unchanged 
(Chart 5). As countries thwart adjustment in their 
exchange rates, that adjustment can be displaced 
onto countries with open capital markets and floating 
exchange rates (Chart 6).
8
This lack of symmetric adjustment has caused large 
and persistent imbalances in trade and in current 
accounts, as well as unbalanced economic growth. 
For example, China, as well as other EMEs that com-
pete with China in third markets, has tried to forestall 
REER adjustment to its current account and balance 
of payments surpluses. China has resisted growing 
international pressure to increase the flexibility of its 
heavily managed exchange rate, which has allowed it 
to maintain an undervalued exchange rate and to 
promote export-led employment and output growth. 
China and other countries in similar circumstances 
are frustrating adjustment in their real exchange rates 
by accumulating reserves and sterilizing the impact on 
the domestic money supply. In China, the resultant 
financial repression and disintermediation, caused by 
the banking sector’s absorption of central bank 
8  Although the displaced adjustment seen in Chart 6 was not the sole 
factor behind the appreciation of the Canadian, Australian and Swiss 
currencies, it had an impact.
Chart 5:  Real effective exchange rates
Index: 1990=100
Sources: JP Morgan, IMF World Economic Outlook and authors’ 
calculations  Last observation: 2010
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now re-emerging because real exchange rates have 
remained relatively unchanged. These flow imbal-
ances are causing an ever-increasing stock imbal-
ance. EME reserves, which are enormous, are largely 
invested in U.S.-dollar assets. Consequently, they 
represent a substantial source of vulnerability in the 
global economy because of their sheer size and lack 
of diversification. Reserve holders would incur sig-
nificant capital losses if the U.S. dollar were to 
depreciate.
9
To address the flow and stock imbalances that 
threaten the global economy, the IMS needs to be 
reformed. In the next section, we outline our vision 
for the IMS and make the case for its adoption.
Renewing the International 
Monetary System
Given the pervasive imbalances, currency tensions 
and vulnerabilities, there is a strong need to reform 
the international monetary system to permit more 
symmetric and timely exchange rate adjustment, 
especially among systemically important countries. 
Such an adjustment would facilitate the equilibration 
of trade and capital flows and prevent the re-
emergence of large external imbalances. 
9  In addition, this enormous reserve accumulation is creating a modern 
version of the Triffin dilemma, as countries accumulate more and more 
assets of lower and lower quality, thus reducing the probability that they 
will be paid back in full. This accumulation also increases the likelihood 
that their currency will eventually appreciate, causing capital losses 
on their holdings of foreign-currency assets. See Gourinchas, Rey and 
Truempler (2011) for a fuller discussion.
The various configurations of the IMS over the past 
140 years have not managed to produce a system 
that is resilient to large shocks over the long run. 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the IMS since 1870, 
from the gold standard and gold-exchange standard, 
to the Bretton Woods system (fixed, but adjustable, 
exchange rates, based on the U.S. dollar as the 
international reserve currency), and to the current 
“hybrid” system. The IMS is not static: the current 
system represents an evolution along a continuum 
of possible systems. 
The respective configurations of the IMS have one 
common feature: in each case, fixed exchange rate 
regimes were unable to withstand large shocks. Since 
surplus countries can thwart exchange rate adjustment 
far more easily than deficit countries, the latter often 
bear a disproportionate share of the adjustment. The 
history of the IMS also shows that the system functions 
only if systemically important countries follow policies 
that are consistent with the system. For example, in 
principle, the gold-exchange standard should have 
allowed for symmetric adjustment; however, throughout 
the 1920s, France and the United States, as surplus 
countries, prevented adjustment through sterilized 
intervention (pushing deflation onto the United 
Kingdom, the main deficit country). Similarly, symmetric 
adjustment failed to occur in the 1960s during the 
Bretton Woods era and over the past decade. The main 
lesson from history is that it is not the choice of reserve 
asset that matters, but whether countries follow poli-
cies that permit real exchange rate adjustment.
A new vision is therefore required, one that 
embodies the following characteristics:
•	 promotes timely and symmetric adjustment to 
shocks,
•	 prevents large external imbalances and crises,
•	 provides sufficient global liquidity, and 
•	 maintains confidence in the system.
The last two characteristics are critical for achieving 
global economic stability in the context of increasing 
financial globalization. The IMS also needs to be 
supported by an appropriately constituted set of 
international institutions, which comprise the global 
financial architecture that can effectively promote the 
desirable characteristics listed above. 
To achieve an IMS in which timely and symmetric 
exchange rate adjustment is market based and thus 
inherent to the system, all systemically important 
countries and currency areas should have flexible 
exchange rates in conjunction with a monetary policy 
Chart 7:  Excess Chinese savings 
Note: Companies include non-fi  nancial corporations and fi  nancial 
institutions
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normally defined as low, stable and predictable 
inflation. Such a monetary policy framework must 
itself be underpinned by a fiscal policy that ensures 
sustainable public finances and therefore preserves 
the central bank’s ability to achieve price stability, 
and by a financial sector policy that promotes finan-
cial system stability via resilient financial institutions 
and markets to ensure the efficient intermediation of 
savings and the effective transmission of monetary 
policy. 
Evidence from a number of countries has shown that 
a flexible, market-determined exchange rate adjusts 
quickly in response to economic shocks, thereby 
acting as a “shock absorber” by mitigating the 
impact of the shock on real economic activity and 
welfare.
10 It is important to note that this adjustment 
is symmetric: it occurs for both negative and positive 
shocks, and it occurs for shocks to both assets 
and goods markets. A flexible exchange rate thus 
increases the resilience of the domestic economy to 
both external and internal shocks.
Flexible exchange rates,  
by themselves,  
are not a panacea
Flexible exchange rates, by themselves, are not a 
panacea, however. Indeed, the experience from the 
period immediately after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system clearly indicates that, in the absence 
of a domestic nominal anchor for inflation expecta-
tions supported by a coherent framework for macro-
economic and financial sector policy, flexible 
exchange rates can be volatile and display over-
shooting behaviour.
11
Although it took almost 20 years after the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system, public authorities 
eventually recognized that a well-functioning, flexible 
exchange rate regime must be supported by central 
banks with a mandate of price stability and by fiscal 
authorities that allow central banks the operational 
independence to pursue this goal. As a conse-
quence, the volatility and dramatic misalignments 
10 See, for example, Murray, Schembri and St-Amant (2003), for a recent 
study of Canada, and Broda (2004) for a study of a set of developing 
countries.
11 The most notable example occurred during the Reagan-Volcker era in 
the early to mid-1980s, when the U.S. dollar appreciated almost 40 per 
cent on a real effective basis and then depreciated by almost the same 
absolute amount.
of exchange rates among Western economies that 
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s declined. 
The adoption of formal inflation targets by New 
Zealand and Canada in 1990 and 1991, respectively, 
has led to broader acceptance of this monetary 
policy framework by an expanding set of countries 
that includes the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Norway, as well as South Africa, Israel, the Czech 
Republic and most countries in Latin America.
12 
Indeed, the widespread adoption of monetary policy 
frameworks consisting of a flexible exchange rate 
with a price-stability mandate ushered in the era of 
the “Great Moderation,” as the combination of 
shock-absorbing flexible exchange rates and well-
anchored inflation expectations provided a solid 
basis for strong economic performance in many of 
these countries.
Rose (2007) and Mihov and Rose (2008) obtain three 
important results concerning the monetary policy 
framework of a formal inflation target and a flexible 
exchange rate that support our proposed vision 
for the IMS. First, they find that such a framework 
reduces exchange rate volatility because it provides 
a credible anchor for inflation expectations. Second, 
and of particular importance for EMEs, they find that 
countries with this framework experience fewer 
“sudden stops” or reversals in capital flows. A flex-
ible exchange rate adjusts to mitigate the volatility 
of capital flows by appreciating (depreciating) when 
net inflows are positive (negative). It also provides 
two-way risk to domestic borrowers and foreign 
investors, thus reducing moral hazard. Unlike a 
pegged exchange rate, a flexible rate does not offer 
a promise, either explicit or implicit, to maintain the 
exchange rate unchanged. The exchange rate risk 
must therefore be borne by the parties involved, 
providing them with an incentive to manage their 
foreign exchange exposures prudently or hedge their 
exposures. This provides an impetus for the develop-
ment of hedging markets and eliminates the need 
for capital controls. Third, they find that the durability 
of this monetary policy framework is historically 
unprecedented: it has been in place for almost 
20 years, and no country has abandoned an inflation-
targeting framework. 
The currency crises of the 1990s in Europe, Mexico, 
Russia and East Asia spurred the wider adoption 
of this monetary policy framework. These crises 
demonstrated the difficulty of maintaining pegged 
12 In addition, while some countries or regions, such as the United States, 
Japan and the euro area, do not have explicit inflation targets, their 
central banks are independent and have a price-stability mandate.
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capital controls. Such “soft” pegs proved to be sub-
ject to self-fulfilling speculative attacks because they 
offered attractive one-way bets to speculators who 
knew that politicians were not willing to sacrifice 
domestic economic goals to preserve the pegged 
rate.
From this negative experience with soft-pegged 
exchange rates and the contrasting positive experi-
ence with flexible exchange rates came the bipolar 
view of exchange rate regimes (Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1995; Fischer 2001). The bipolar view maintained that 
countries had two choices when it came to exchange 
rate regimes: adopt either a hard, fixed exchange 
rate regime (such as a common currency, as among 
euro-area countries; the use of a foreign currency, 
such as the dollar or euro, as with Ecuador or 
Bosnia; or a currency board, as in Bulgaria) or a 
flexible exchange rate regime with a monetary policy 
goal of price stability.
13
While the bipolar view provided a coherent vision for 
the IMS, it did not address transitional issues, espe-
cially with respect to financial market development. 
Many countries were not prepared to jump to this 
vision immediately, and the lack of articulation and 
consensus surrounding the evolution of the policy 
frameworks proved to be a serious obstacle. 
Moreover, in the face of instability in the IMS, many 
EMEs felt compelled to maintain the status quo. 
However, moving toward a more flexible market-
based exchange rate can help alleviate the distortions 
created by a heavily managed, undervalued exchange 
rate.
14 In particular, if the exchange rate were allowed 
to appreciate gradually, it would boost domestic pur-
chasing power, which would increase domestic con-
sumption, and raise imports, since they would 
become relatively less expensive. Concerns that such 
a move would have a large negative impact on export 
competitiveness are often overstated, because the 
increase in purchasing power would mitigate wage 
demands. Furthermore, domestic prices and wages 
would adjust to reduce the impact of any apprecia-
tion. Finally, increased exchange rate flexibility would 
increase monetary policy autonomy, allowing 
domestic authorities more scope to control rising 
inflation without resorting to altering reserve ratios 
13 Note that a hard, fixed exchange rate effectively defines the domestic 
monetary policy framework in the context of capital mobility because 
maintaining the fixed rate essentially becomes the goal of monetary 
policy.
14 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated, “In the case of China, there is a lack 
of balance, coordination and sustainability in the economic development” 
(Wen 2010).
and other types of credit controls, which are generally 
less effective. In the absence of nominal exchange 
rate flexibility, adjustment of the real exchange rate 
would tend to occur through rising prices and 
increasing inflationary pressures as market forces 
eventually assert themselves, as is the case in China. 
Higher inflation could, however, undermine financial 
stability, because asset prices would also increase. 
For example, housing prices in China have risen more 
than 60 per cent since July 2009 (Chart 8).
In asset markets, increased exchange rate flexibility 
would reduce the need for the rapid accumulation of 
reserves and sterilization. Thus, banks, in turn, could 
redirect deposits away from purchases of steriliza-
tion bonds and toward loans to households and 
firms, thereby reducing the pressure on them to 
self-finance with excess savings. Greater exchange 
rate flexibility would also create an incentive for the 
development of financial markets: first to hedge 
exchange rate risk, and second to create a short-
term money market or government securities market 
to serve as a basis for broader capital-market  
activities. Such a market would allow the central 
bank to eventually adopt a short-term interest rate 
instrument for monetary policy—a more efficient way 
of influencing monetary conditions than the existing 
quantitative instruments or controls, namely, the 
reserve ratio.
As financial markets and banking activities develop, 
capital controls can be loosened, but again, the flex-
ible exchange rate would help stabilize capital flows 
since it would tend to appreciate (depreciate) when 
there are net inflows (outflows), reducing the incen-
tives for such flows. Many Latin American countries 
Chart 8:  House prices in China
Soufun Index, July 2009 = 100
Sources: Soufun, Bank of Canada and authors’ calculations
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their financial markets, including the development of 
local-currency bond markets, following the adoption 
of a more flexible market-based exchange rate. This 
policy has been underpinned by strong fiscal and 
monetary policy frameworks, as well as robust finan-
cial sector regulation and supervision. This gradual 
path to liberalization and financial market develop-
ment would also have substantial benefits for China. 
Given China’s leadership position in East Asia, 
among EMEs and in the G-20, the movement toward 
a flexible exchange rate regime would help to pro-
mote widespread adoption of this regime and would 
have important positive effects on the global 
economy. Reform of the global financial architecture 
would also help countries pursue this avenue of 
policy reform.
Renewing the Global Financial 
Architecture
As a result of the crisis, comprehensive plans are 
being put in place to overhaul domestic and inter-
national financial structures. Although this reform 
process is ongoing, much has been accomplished. 
The G-20 succeeded the G-7 as the premier eco-
nomic forum. With its broader representation, which 
includes the major EMEs, and the regular participa-
tion of leaders, the G-20 can provide the leadership 
and legitimacy to increase the political traction of 
economic reform. 
The G-20 can provide the leadership 
and legitimacy to increase the political  
traction of economic reform
The FSB superseded the Financial Stability Forum. 
In addition to the name change, its membership has 
expanded from the G-10 to beyond the G-20 to 
include other countries with significant financial 
sectors, such as the Netherlands and Singapore. 
The FSB has been given a clear mandate to take 
the lead on financial sector reform in several areas, 
including Basel III standards for bank capital and 
liquidity, shadow banking, financial market infra-
structure and systemically important financial institu-
tions. The representation of the IMF has also been 
renewed to better reflect the composition of global 
economic activity and thus give EMEs a larger voice 
and a greater stake in preserving global economic 
and financial stability. The IMF has also been given 
more resources and has expanded its precautionary 
facilities to allow countries access to contingent 
funding should an adverse event occur. In general, 
all of the key global institutions have been strength-
ened and have become more representative of the 
global economy, with the intention that EMEs will 
take more responsibility for maintaining the stability 
of the IMS. 
The global financial architecture that is emerging 
from the crisis has, now more than ever, the capacity 
to promote and support the transition of the current 
IMS to one with greater exchange rate flexibility, 
more timely and symmetric adjustment to external 
imbalances, and greater global financial stability. 
Broadly speaking, the G-20 leaders can provide 
direction, the IMF can offer significant analytic cap-
acity, and the FSB can coordinate financial sector 
reforms with all of the key players at the table. The BIS, 
which provides a useful forum for co-operation between 
central banks, could also play an expanded role. 
Because the international financial institutions 
cannot impose economic policies on sovereign 
countries, the G-20 has established the Framework 
for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth to 
encourage its systemically important member coun-
tries to co-operate and move toward greater 
exchange rate flexibility and more sustainable 
macroeconomic and financial policy frameworks for 
their individual and collective benefit. To this end, the 
Framework incorporates a mutual assessment pro-
cess of macroeconomic and financial sector policies 
to increase the global coherence of medium-term 
policy frameworks. Balanced growth implies that 
current account and fiscal positions should shrink 
to ensure that global growth is also sustainable. An 
important outcome of this process is a G-20 Action 
Plan to identify and coordinate the needed macro-
economic and financial reforms. 
Concluding Remarks
The international monetary system is not working 
and needs reform. The lack of exchange rate adjust-
ment not only led to the emergence of the substan-
tial external imbalances in the United States and 
China, which contributed to the financial crisis of 
2007–09, but is also forestalling the rotation of global 
demand needed to strengthen the global economic 
recovery. Indeed, the very weak and protracted 
recovery in the United States and Europe is aggra-
vating their fiscal and financial problems.
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